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When agencies implement their statutes, administrative law doctrine describes
what they do as interpretation. This raises the question of how much deference courts
ought to give to such agency interpretations of law. This Article claims, however, that
something else is usually going on when agencies implement statutory schemes. Although
agencies interpret law, as they must, as an incident to enforce the law, agencies also
exercise another power altogether: an interstitial lawmaking, gap-filling, policymaking
power, a power that I shall call the “specification power.” This Article aims to advance
existing accounts of agency activity and judicial deference by demonstrating that
agencies exercise distinct powers of law-interpretation and law-specification when
implementing a statutory scheme. Most significantly, it provides a constitutional
account for why agencies may exercise this specification power as a formalist matter,
even if they cannot have final say over the interpretation of law. If this account is
correct, then calls to overturn modern judicial deference may be overblown if agencies
are usually exercising their powers not of interpretation, but of specification.
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INTRODUCTION
The executive power to interpret law is at the center of modern debates
over administrative law and the separation of powers. The doctrine
announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council holds
that courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute that it administers.1 The doctrine is justiﬁed on at least
two grounds: when Congress enacts statutes with ambiguities, Congress is
presumed to delegate implicitly to the agencies the authority to resolve those
ambiguities;2 and agencies are more politically accountable, technically
expert, and institutionally competent than courts to do so.3
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (stating that Chevron
deference is “premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation
from Congress to the agency to ﬁll in the statutory gaps”); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S.
638, 649 (1990) (“A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of
administrative authority.”); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 319 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Barrett, 494 U.S. at 649).
3 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
231 (1974)); see also, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990)
1
2
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Chevron’s “canonical”4 status in administrative law, however, may be
fraying. Critics have noted the apparent inconsistency between Chevron
deference and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which provides in
§ 706 that a reviewing court “shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”5 Deference to executive
interpretations also appears inconsistent with the structural separation of
powers: Article III assigns the judicial power to “say what the law is”6 to
judges with life tenure and salary protections so they may exercise their legal
judgment while insulated from the political accountability that seems to
justify Chevron deference.7 Finally, recent scholarship has suggested that
historically courts may have respected only those executive interpretations
that were contemporaneous with the enactment of the law or were
longstanding, and were thus good evidence of what the law actually was.8 For
these reasons, even former Justice Kennedy has joined calls from his more
formalist colleagues to reconsider “the premises that underlie Chevron.”9
Many scholars, however, maintain that deference is inevitable. Nicholas
Bednar and Kristin Hickman recently argued, for example, that Chevron
deference, or something much like it, “is a necessary consequence of and
corollary to Congress’s longstanding habit of relying on agencies to exercise
substantial policymaking discretion to resolve statutory details.”10 Unless
Congress assumes “substantially more responsibility for making policy choices
itself” or the courts “reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine,” they write,
(“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.”); Bowen
v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (noting that the deference in Chevron was “predicated
on expertise”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2597-98 (2006) (“[T]he general argument for judicial deference to executive
interpretations rests on the undeniable claims that specialized competence is often highly relevant and
that political accountability plays a legitimate role in the choice of one or another approach.”).
4 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296 (describing Chevron as “now-canonical”); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006) (noting Chevron’s “foundational” and
even “quasi-constitutional” status).
5 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018); see also, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 871 (2001) (noting Chevron’s “conﬂict with the APA” and suggesting a way
to resolve it).
6 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
7 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465-66, 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (setting forth the institutional and structural protections given to the judiciary).
8 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908,
916-19 (2017) (“Under the traditional interpretive approach, American courts ‘respected’
longstanding and contemporaneous executive interpretations of law . . . .”).
9 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10 Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1392, 1398 (2017).
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“some variant of Chevron deference will be essential to guide and assist courts
from intruding too deeply into a policy sphere for which they are ill-suited.”11
A veritable legion of scholars has argued that deference is inevitable because
the interpretation of broad statutory standards requires policymaking
discretion, or the resolving of statutory “ambiguities” is for policymakers.12 And
legal realists maintain that all interpretation inherently entails policymaking.13
In short, when agencies implement statutory schemes, the doctrine treats
their actions as “interpretations.”14 This then raises the question of how much
courts ought to defer to such interpretations of law, a question that remains
unresolved by courts and scholars. The claim here is that this debate has stalled
Id.
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV.
611, 611, 617 (2009) (suggesting that ambiguity should simply be treated as calling for an exercise of
policymaking); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 846, 848 (2010)
(distinguishing between situations “in which there is statutory language against which to judge the
agency’s action and one in which there is not,” but noting that the latter includes “the possibility
that an agency might, in the future, adopt a diﬀerent interpretation”); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 464 (1989)
(“When Congress has failed to speak clearly or comprehensively, who gets to decide what the law
is? . . . When a regulatory statute is ambiguous . . . the agency stands as a potential alternative
recipient of the power inevitably created by the legislature’s ﬁnite capacity for prescience and
precision in expression.” (ﬁrst emphasis added)); Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of
Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 188 (2012)
(“[T]he Court has begun to reclaim the interpretive power it ceded and the lawmaking power it
shifted with the rise and fall of Chevron.” (emphasis added)); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (“A statement that judicial deference is mandated
to an administrative ‘interpretation’ of a statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial
conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency.”); id.
at 7 (“[O]nce the delegation of law-making competence to administrative agencies is recognized as
permissible, judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is simply one way of recognizing such
a delegation.” (emphases added)); id. at 28 (“Indeed, it would be violating legislative supremacy by
failing to defer to the interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been delegated lawmaking authority.” (emphases added)); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron
Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 963 (2018) (“A court that holds that an ambiguous statute
constitutes a delegation of power to the agency is interpreting the statute . . . .”); Peter L. Strauss,
“Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 1143, 1144-45, 1159-60 (2012) (arguing that agencies have policymaking discretion in “Chevron
spaces,” which are “created by statutory imprecision” and when “statutory meaning is uncertain”).
The Supreme Court has also been unable to disentangle these notions since it decided Chevron. See,
e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“Yet it can still be apparent from the
agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute
or ﬁlls a space in the enacted law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
13 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2587, 2591-93 (noting the close relationship between interpretation
and policymaking).
14 As the Court has said, “the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of
reason) of such statutes.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
983 (2005) (emphasis added).
11
12
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because, although the doctrine treats agency implementations of statutes as
interpretation, something else is in fact usually going on. Agencies do interpret
law as an incident to enforcing the law, but they also do something else: they
exercise a kind of interstitial lawmaking, gap-filling, policymaking power where
the statute is clear but does not specify a course of action, a power that I shall
call the “specification power.”
Although many deference proponents have intuited that agencies are doing
something along these lines, they have been unable to escape the doctrinal
vocabulary of interpretation and therefore have failed to provide an accurate
descriptive or constitutional account of this power.15 A few scholars have
recognized that the doctrine seems to conflate two different powers or
activities,16 but none provides a complete constitutional account of why
agencies may exercise this policymaking power, nor provides a satisfactory
account of what distinguishes the “interpretation” that agencies do from their
“policymaking.”17 This Article supplements the work of these scholars,
illustrating the distinction between interpretation and “specification” and
providing arguments from the Constitution’s text, structure, and history for
why agencies may exercise this specification power.
American legal history is replete with examples of the exercise of both
kinds of power. In the 1840 case of Decatur v. Paulding, the Court was
confronted with two statutes, one which granted a pension to all widows of
naval service members, and another which granted a pension speciﬁcally to
the widow of Commodore Stephen Decatur.18 Mrs. Decatur sought to collect
both pensions.19 The Court recognized that the interpretation of this law
could leave room for discretion and even disagreement, and thus the Court
would not compel the executive to adopt one interpretation over another

15 See, e.g., Bednar & Hickman, supra note 10, at 1446-53 (referring to agency interpretation of
statutes as both “interpretation” and “gap”-ﬁlling); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2591-93 (explaining the
legal realist insight that the exercise of “interpretation” inherently involves policymaking decisions);
see also generally supra note 12.
16 See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 691 (2007) (“The
Court’s labeling of administrative work as statutory construction has obscured the distinct carrying-out
role of public bureaucracies.”); Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1867, 1891 (2015) (noting that “two meanings” of Chevron are “often confounded”); Lawrence B.
Solum & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Construction 3 (Dec. 13, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300626 [https://perma.cc/TZX7-U7TE] (asking
whether “there are actually two quite distinct Chevron doctrines?”); see also infra Part I.D.
17 See infra Part I.D.
18 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 498 (1840).
19 Id.
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through a writ of mandamus.20 But the Court also noted that had a
nonmandamus action been brought, then “the Court certainly would not be
bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a department” because
in such cases it is the Court’s “duty to interpret the act of Congress, in order
to ascertain the rights of the parties in the cause before them.”21
On the other hand, one of the earliest federal statutes provided that the
military pensions that had been granted and paid by the states pursuant to
the acts of the Confederation Congress to the wounded and disabled veterans
of the Revolutionary War “shall be continued and paid by the United States,
from the fourth day of March last, for the space of one year, under such
regulations as the President of the United States may direct.”22 President
Washington’s regulations stated that the sums owed were to be paid in “two
equal payments,” the ﬁrst on March 5, 1790, and the second on June 5, 1790,
and that each application for payment was to be accompanied by certain
vouchers as evidence that the invalid served in a particular regiment or vessel
at the time he was disabled.23
This is a particularly clear example of an executive oﬃcer exercising a
power not of interpretation, but of what we might call speciﬁcation. The
regulation concerning two equal payments to be made three months apart was
certainly a reasonable interpretation of the statute, which required the
payments to be made within one year. Yet the executive could have chosen
any number of other options: daily installments for the entire year, three
installments at varying intervals to be completed within the year, and so on.
Each of these options, in and of itself, would have been a reasonable
interpretation of the statute because the statute only required such payments
to be made within a year.
The act of choosing among these various possible interpretations, however,
was not an act of interpretation. Nothing in the statute demanded one regulation
over another; all would have been reasonable interpretations because all would
have been permitted by the statute. The choice among these options, then, was
not an act of interpretation, and that choice requires a different vocabulary. I
20 Id. at 515 (“The head of an executive department of the government, in the administration
of the various and important concerns of his oﬃce, . . . must exercise his judgment in expounding
the laws and resolutions of Congress, under which he is from time to time required to act.”).
21 Id. This element of the case is discussed in Bamzai, supra note 8, at 951-52. As explained,
although the courts did defer to executive interpretations of law, they did so only according to two
canons of statutory construction that aﬀorded weight to such interpretations if they were
contemporaneous with the enactment of the law itself, or were longstanding, in which case they
would be good evidence of what the law actually was. Id. at 916-18, 933, 937.
22 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95, 95.
23 These regulations are preserved in the Library of Congress, and can be viewed at An Act Providing
for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States (Oct. 13, 1789), reprinted in LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.21201200/?sp=1 [https://perma.cc/R29C-C9SU].
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suggest the term “specification”: the executive officers specified this detail of
implementation—this course of action—within the bounds of what the statute
permitted but without more specific direction from the statute itself. Nothing
in the statute bore on their choice, so long as it was within the range of options
created by the best interpretation of the statute’s limits.
Now consider another case: A statute provides that a “stationary source” is
defined as “any building, structure, facility, or installation” which emits air
pollution. The statute does not say, however, what to do when more than one
of these definitions applies, for example when there is a facility that includes
multiple structures and installations. A judge might do all the “interpretation”
there is to do—ascertaining the meaning of all the relevant terms as well as the
legal effect of those terms against the structure and backdrop of the entire
statute and preexisting law more broadly—and the statute might simply not
answer the question. The statute is not ambiguous, nor is it vague. It has simply
left a “gap” or a “silence,” a space within which the executive might specify the
course of action in order to implement the statutory scheme. Here, again, the
result of the executive’s choice would, of course, be a reasonable interpretation
of the statute; but the act of choosing among the multiple permissible options
would not be an act of interpretation. These were the facts of Chevron itself,24
facts that call for an exercise of the specification power. This is the power to fill
in the details where the statute is clear but does not specify the course of action.
Although agencies may not have ﬁnal say over the interpretation of law,
their exercise of the speciﬁcation power is rooted in the text, structure, and
history of both the “legislative power” and the “executive power.” Chief
Justice John Marshall recognized long ago that there was a category of power
partly but not wholly legislative in its nature—we shall call it here
“nonexclusive” legislative power—that Congress may exercise itself or
delegate to the other branches.25 He described this power as the power to “ﬁll
up the details” of a general statutory provision.26 The speciﬁcation power may
also be deduced from the vesting of “the executive power” in the chief
executive, whether one adopts the prevailing formalist account that the
vesting clause is a residual grant of power or the view that it merely grants a
power of law-execution.27
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 859-62 (1984).
The term “nonexclusive legislative power” is the author’s. It is inspired by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, in which he distinguished between “exclusively legislative” power
that Congress cannot delegate—that is, a power that in its nature was strictly and solely legislative,
and which therefore had to be exercised by Congress—and power that “Congress may certainly
delegate to others,” but which it also “may rightfully exercise itself.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825).
26 Id. at 43.
27 See infra Section III.B. At this juncture, it is worth distinguishing the account put forward
here from three other accounts. First, Jack Goldsmith and John Manning have argued that the
24
25
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly canvasses the literature on
judicial deference to show that the doctrine and the literature describe agency
action in this sphere as “interpretation.” It then shows that the debate over
whether to defer to such interpretations has stalled because the principal
antagonists in the debate seem to presume the agency power at issue is
different, although they all refer to it using the same vocabulary of
interpretation. Part II seeks to demonstrate that agencies have historically
exercised not only a power of law-interpretation, but also a power of lawspecification, when implementing a statutory scheme. Part III provides a
constitutional account for why agencies may exercise this specification power,
even if they cannot have final say over the interpretation of law. Part IV teases
out the implications, revisiting the Chevron decision and making a formalist
case for a kind of deference, at least to an agency’s specification power. This
Part also demonstrates how this distinction may clarify other administrative
law puzzles, such as the distinction between interpretative and legislative rules
for purposes of the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures.
I. THE STANDARD DEBATE
The Chevron decision is one of the most cited in all administrative law.28
The brief sections that follow seek only to elucidate the nature of the existing
debate, and how it has stalled.
President has a power to “complete” laws. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s
Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280 (2006). They do not recognize this power, however, as distinct
from the power of law-interpretation. Id. at 2290 (arguing that the completion power includes
“authority to resolve statutory ambiguities or ﬁll up statutory interstices”). The term “completion”
power is also not the best term because the executive never quite completes a statutory scheme, but
rather speciﬁes particular details when necessary for implementation.
Second, Peter Strauss has described a “Chevron space,” a space of policymaking discretion that
exists in between the spaces where statutory meaning is clear and compels a particular action on the
one hand, and is clear and prohibits an action on the other. Strauss, supra note 12, at 1145. That
approach is similar to the one presented here, but there is an important diﬀerence: under a
speciﬁcation power analysis even where the statute is not “clear” (i.e., it neither clearly requires, nor
clearly prohibits the action), it is still up to the courts to decide whether the best interpretation of
the statute permits the particular option.
Finally, another way to think about the speciﬁcation power is that it is exercised in those classes
of cases to which Justice Kavanaugh would simply apply arbitrary and capricious review after a court
has done all the interpretation there is to do at “Step One” of Chevron. See Brett M. Kavanaugh,
Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2153-54 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (explaining that in cases where statutes use “broad and
open-ended terms,” courts should defer to agency interpretation in the same way they do when
conducting an arbitrary and capricious review). Although Kavanaugh’s account works within the
existing doctrinal vocabulary, its central idea is consistent with the argument presented here.
28 See, e.g., Herz, supra note 16, at 1870 n.19 (“It seems an obligation of the form to point out
that Chevron is the most cited decision in administrative law.”); Peter M. Shane & Christopher J.
Walker, Foreword, Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475
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A. Chevron and Its Rationales
Chevron announced the rule that, when reviewing an agency’s
implementing regulations, a court must ﬁrst ask “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”29 If the statute clearly
answers the question, “that is the end of the matter”; but “if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the speciﬁc issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.”30 That means the court must defer to the agency’s
interpretation of the statute even if it is not the “best” reading—that is, the
reading at which the court itself would have arrived if it were asked to
interpret the statute in the ﬁrst instance.31
The Court and literature have suggested several rationales for the rule.
Early on, the cases and literature theorized that statutory ambiguities are
implicit delegations of authority from Congress to the agencies to resolve
those ambiguities.32 The Court in Chevron also relied upon agency
accountability and expertise, and later commentators have emphasized these
rationales.33 The Court relied on precedent, stating that it has “long
& n.2, 495 (2014) (concluding that “Chevron is the most cited administrative law decision of all time”
with, as of that time, over 68,000 citations across judicial decisions, court ﬁlings, and law review
articles while Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), another competitor for most cited
case, had only 48,608 total citations).
29 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
30 Id. at 842-43.
31 Id. at 843 n.11; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 983 (2005) (“Chevron teaches that a court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous
statute an agency is charged with administering is not authoritative . . . . Instead, the agency
may . . . choose a diﬀerent construction, since the agency remains the authoritative
interpreter . . . of such statutes.”).
32 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (describing
deference as “premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation
from Congress to the agency to ﬁll in the statutory gaps”); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S.
638, 649 (1990) (“A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of
administrative authority.”); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 319 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting the same); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (arguing that Chevron announced “an acrossthe-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant”). But see Michael
Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 187, 195-96 (1992) (arguing that the political and constitutional “rivalry” between the
legislative and executive branches undercuts the theory that “Congress actually wants to hand over
power to the agencies” and arguing that statutory ambiguities are mainly the result of legislative
constraints, not a “conscious desire of Congress to leave policy-making to the agency”).
33 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“Judges are not experts in the ﬁeld, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government.”); see also Pension Beneﬁt Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S.
633, 651-52 (1990) (“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justiﬁcations behind Chevron
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recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer.”34 In a subsequent case, Justice Scalia sought to root the doctrine
in the history of mandamus review.35 As the next two subsections show, the
two principal sides to the debate can never come to a fundamental agreement
about these rationales because both work within the same doctrinal
vocabulary of “interpretation,” but each in fact maintains a very diﬀerent
understanding of the agency power at issue.
B. The Case Against Deference: Article III
Ever since Chevron was decided, there have been scholars who have argued
that deference to agency statutory interpretation violates Article III, which vests
the judicial power “to say what the law is”36 in life-tenured, salary-protected
judges.37 The most systematic critic has been Philip Hamburger, who challenges
deference in a long book on administrative law38 and in a more recent article.39
In the latter, Hamburger argues that “judges under Article III have the
constitutional office or duty to exercise their own independent judgment about
what the law is for their purposes,”40 a duty which justifies not only the power
of judges to decide cases but also “their security in their tenure and salaries.”41
Indeed, one of the core rationales for Chevron deference has been the
relative political accountability of administrative agencies.42 Yet judges were
accorded life tenure and salary protections to avoid this kind of political
accountability when making legal judgments. In The Federalist, Hamilton
argued that if courts were to be “bulwarks of a limited Constitution,” there
deference.”); Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (noting that the deference
accorded in Chevron was “predicated on expertise”); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2597-98 (“[T]he
general argument for judicial deference to executive interpretations rests on the undeniable claims
that specialized competence is often highly relevant and that political accountability plays a
legitimate role in the choice of one or another approach.”).
34 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 & n.14 (citing cases supporting this view).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241-42 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in courts whose judges “shall hold their
Oﬃces during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Oﬃce.”). For some early
literature on the apparent inconsistency of Chevron and Article III, see, for example, Farina, supra
note 12, at 467, 528.
38 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 309-21 (2014) (describing
and criticizing various forms of judicial deference).
39 Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016).
40 Id. at 1195.
41 Id. at 1209.
42 See Sunstein, supra note 3.
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ought to be “permanent tenure of judicial oﬃces,” which would contribute to
an “independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.”43
These concerns have been echoed by a number of Justices of the Supreme
Court, particularly Justice Antonin Scalia, who perhaps more than any other
judge is responsible for the prominence of modern-day deference.44
Notwithstanding his support for deference, Scalia noted the apparent
inconsistency between deference to agency legal interpretations and the
requirements of Article III.45
Most recently, Justice Thomas wrote in Michigan v. EPA that “[t]he judicial
power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws,” and that
“[i]nterpreting federal statutes—including ambiguous ones administered by an
agency—‘calls for that exercise of independent judgment.’”46 Thomas argues that
transferring interpretive authority to agencies “is in tension with Article III’s
Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts,
not administrative agencies.”47 And if what’s going on is not interpretation but
rather a kind of legislative power (as I shall argue below), Justice Thomas has said
that giving this legislative power to agencies would also violate the Constitution,
which requires Congress to exercise such power with limited historical exceptions
for courts.48 Justice Thomas has been recently joined on the Court by Justice
Gorsuch, who shares his views on deference.49

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
For Justice Scalia’s inﬂuence, see Scalia, supra note 32, at 512 (arguing the deference should
be accorded even to a “pure question of statutory construction”); id. at 514 (explaining that the cases
justify deference to administrative legal interpretations on the basis of the “‘expertise’ of the agencies
in question,” their “intense familiarity with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue,” and
“their practical knowledge of what will best eﬀectuate those purposes”); id. at 516 (rooting Chevron’s
theoretical justiﬁcation in a theory of congressional intent to delegate to agencies interpretive
authority to resolve ambiguities).
45 Id. at 513 (“Indeed, on its face the suggestion [to defer to an executive agency on a question
of law] seems quite incompatible with Marshall’s aphorism that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
46 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217, 1219 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).
47 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
48 Id. at 2713.
49 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”). Justice
Kavanaugh may also share these views. He would cabin deference to cases of “broad and open-ended
terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable.’” Kavanaugh, supra note 29, at 2153; see
also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448-49 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[S]ome cases involve regulations that employ broad and open-ended terms like ‘reasonable,’
‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable.’ Those kinds of terms aﬀord agencies broad policy discretion,
43
44
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What, then, explained the Court’s departure from these constitutional
requirements in Chevron? The Court, as explained, appears to have relied on
precedents dating back to the early Republic in which courts deferred to
executive interpretations of law. According to recent scholarship, however,
this reliance was likely misplaced. The federal courts appear not to have
deferred to executive interpretations as such; rather, they seem to have
deferred to them in accordance with two canons of statutory construction that
treated contemporaneous executive interpretations and longstanding
executive interpretations as good evidence of what the law actually is.50 In
other words, if agencies are interpreting law, then the constitutional case for
deference is relatively weak.
C. The Case for Deference: Interstitial Lawmaking
The defenses of deference to agency interpretations of law, for the most
part, are not rooted in constitutional arguments, but rather in a “realistic”
view of law itself. According to this view, neither administrators nor judges
really “interpret” law, but rather “make” law. Many scholars have argued that
“interpreting” broad statutory provisions entails signiﬁcant policymaking
discretion, and policymaking is for the political branches.
In 1991, Ann Woolhandler suggested that “the most coherent justiﬁcation
for judicial deference to agency lawmaking (sometimes called ‘policymaking’
or the ‘exercise of discretion’) is that agencies exercise delegated legislative
power.”51 If this justiﬁcation were unlawful because of the principle that
Congress cannot delegate its legislative power, then that raises the question
“how it was that the courts themselves” had historically exercised similar
policymaking functions.52 Woolhandler explains that “[s]ome lawmaking
functions must inevitably ﬂow to the branches that apply legislation to
particular facts, that is, the executive or the judiciary.”53 Although “such
executive action is verbalized as law-execution or administration, and such
judicial action is verbalized as law-judging, interpretation, or discovering,
they all nevertheless involve lawmaking functions.”54 Once it is recognized
that both “administration” of the law and the judicial “interpretation” of the
and courts allow an agency to reasonably exercise its discretion to choose among the options allowed
by the text of the rule.”).
50 Bamzai, supra note 8, at 930-47 (showing that these early cases relied on the contemporanea
expositio and interpres consuetudo canons of constructions, and did not defer to executive
interpretations of law qua executive interpretations of law).
51 Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 213 (1991).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 205.
54 Id.
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law involve the same kind of function, and that this function is one of
lawmaking or policymaking that the courts are not uniquely qualiﬁed to
discharge, the case for deference is stronger than if one adopts a rigidly
formalist account of the separation of powers.55
Fifteen years later, Cass Sunstein argued that the Court’s rationales in
Chevron amounted to “a candid recognition that assessments of policy are
sometimes indispensable to statutory interpretation.”56 Sunstein sees deference
as an outgrowth of “the legal realist attack on the autonomy of legal reasoning”
and the shift from common-law regulation to administrative regulation.57
Sunstein cites to the legal realists Max Radin and Ernst Freund, who argued
that “the inevitable ambiguities of language” make the interpretation of law “a
controlling factor in the effect of legislative instruments,” and thus make courts
a “rival organ with the legislature in the development of the written law.”58
Supposing that the legal realists “were broadly right” to suggest that
policymaking inheres in interpreting statutory ambiguity, “then there seems to
be little reason to think that courts, rather than the executive, should be making
the key judgments.”59 In sum, the recognition of executive “law-interpreting
power can be understood as a natural outgrowth of the twentieth-century shift
from judicial to executive branch lawmaking.”60
In light of the growing calls to cabin Chevron, Nicholas Bednar and Kristin
Hickman recently invoked similar arguments. Because “statutory ambiguity is
unavoidable,” or put differently, because “statutory questions simply do not
have answers that can be derived through traditional common law reasoning,”
55 Woolhandler was not the ﬁrst to make arguments along these lines. See also, e.g., Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions,
41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307 (1988) (arguing that “through the process of statutory interpretation” in
many cases, “courts are resolving a policy issue that Congress raised but declined to resolve” and
thus a judge’s “personal political philosophy inﬂuences greatly his resolution of the policy issue”
(footnote omitted)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 507-08 (1985) (“Comparative institutional analysis
demonstrates that, when Congress enacts a statute that raises but does not resolve an important
policy issue, the executive branch is the preferred institution to resolve that issue.”).
Henry P. Monaghan made similar arguments in his famous article on judicial deference,
published one year before Chevron. See Monaghan, supra note 12. He explained that “once the
delegation of law-making competence to administrative agencies is recognized as permissible,
judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is simply one way of recognizing such a
delegation.” Id. at 7. Monaghan explained that “[t]he current fashion is to decry the sweeping
delegations of law-making authority conferred upon administrative agencies,” but “[o]nce the
propriety of agency law making is recognized, the analytic problem is considerably simpliﬁed.
Judicial deference to agency ‘interpretation’ of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making
authority to an agency.” Id. at 25-26.
56 Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2587.
57 Id. at 2591.
58 Id. (quoting Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 208 (1917)).
59 Id. at 2592.
60 Id. at 2595.
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resolution of these questions depends on policy considerations.61 For example,
Bednar and Hickman argue that the Communications Act of 1934 gave the
Federal Communications Commission “specific authority to establish uniform
standards of accounting for utilities,” but nothing in the statute “offered more
detailed guidance regarding the content” of those standards.62 What was the
Court to do, other than defer and review for a minimum quantum of
rationality?63 “[P]articularly given the complexity of modern statutes,”
Congress often intends “that agencies have discretion in filling the gap.”64
Further, eliminating Chevron “will not magically resolve the problem of
statutory ambiguity,” over which judges themselves will disagree; this
disagreement again prompts the question whether judges or administrators
should resolve these ambiguities.65 Several other scholars have similarly argued
that interpretive ambiguity often calls for policymaking discretion.66
Formalists tend to reject this line of argument. Cynthia Farina has
observed, for example, that “this nonchalant classification of law interpretation
as simply a species of lawmaking is troubling,” and that “[i]ts logical
implication—that what courts, the archetypal interpreters, do when they
construe a law is really no different than what legislatures, the archetypal
lawmakers, do when they create a law—looks wondrous strange against the
backdrop of our 200-year legal tradition.”67 To be sure, at least one formalist,
Philip Hamburger, has recognized that judges do in fact engage in a kind of
lawmaking when exercising the judicial power. “It is widely recognized that
judges often use their interpretation as a mode of lawmaking,” but it would be
a “gross overstatement . . . to conclude” that this interpretation “is merely
lawmaking.”68 In the end, Hamburger argues, it “also is interpretation,”69—that
is, the judicial power simultaneously partakes of interpretive and lawmaking
qualities. Thus, judges should exercise independent judgment regardless.70
Sunstein shares a similar position, but reaches a different conclusion. Adopting
the view of the legal realists that lawmaking inheres in all acts of interpretation,
Sunstein would have judges share this interpretive power with agencies.71

Bednar & Hickman, supra note 10, at 1446-47.
Id. at 1447-48.
Id. at 1448.
Id. at 1449; see also id. at 1458 (“[M]any statutes contemplate that agencies will exercise
discretion to ﬁll statutory gaps . . . .”).
65 Id. at 1453.
66 See supra note 12.
67 Farina, supra note 12, at 477.
68 Hamburger, supra note 39, at 1223.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2582-84.
61
62
63
64
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D. Policymaking and the Interpretation-Construction Distinction
Some scholars have recognized that there are, in fact, two distinct powers
at play that the Court’s deference framework seems to conflate. Elizabeth Foote
has argued that Chevron’s “paradigm” that “mainstream public administration is
the same activity as statutory construction”72 is incorrect as a matter of
administrative theory, which posits that agencies are doing much more than
merely interpreting law when “carrying out” administrative statutes. She argues
that the “administrative function is an operational, policy-implementing role”
that is “quite foreign to the work product of a court.”73 “[A]gencies implement
their enabling acts with a combination of expertise, practicality, interest-group
input, and political will,” and not the “judicial-style methodology that would
be principally attentive to the text and structure” of statutes.74 The inputs that
go into agency decisions go beyond statutory interpretation and include
technical assessments, expert predictions, policy views, public input, political
influence, and practical needs.75 This distinction between statutory
interpretation or construction on the one hand and the administrative “carrying
out” of statutes on the other, Foote argues, was the conception shared by the
Congress that enacted the APA.76
Foote sees, correctly, that there are really two distinct powers at issue, but
does not clearly explain the distinction. It is not entirely clear in her account
what divides statutory construction from “public administration”; Foote
argues that a court should ask “whether the question on review is necessarily
a legal question,” or whether it “requires ﬂexibility in application, political
responsiveness, public participation, factual development, expertise, and
practical considerations of enforcement and management.”77 Thus she
suggests Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education,78 a case
that has all the hallmarks of being genuinely about statutory interpretation,79
should nevertheless be considered as dealing with “public administration”
because it involves a “highly technical, specialized interstitial matter.”80 Foote

Foote, supra note 16, at 675.
Id. at 678, 680.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682-83, 711.
Id. at 711.
550 U.S. 81 (2007).
The issue was whether the statutory requirement that school funding be calculated by
excluding the “per-pupil expenditures. . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of
such expenditures” allowed the agency to exclude from the calculations schools above and below
these percentiles in terms of total student population. Id. at 84-86 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006)).
80 Foote, supra note 16, at 717-18 (quoting Zuni, 550 U.S. at 90).
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
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also does not provide a constitutional account of why agencies may exercise
this policymaking power at all.
Some scholars have given an account of Chevron deference using the
framework of the interpretation-construction distinction. The first to do so was
Michael Herz.81 More recently, Larry Solum and Cass Sunstein have sought to
explain Chevron based on this distinction.82 Their work provides the clearest and
most convincing descriptive and legal accounts of modern deference. The
specification power has the potential to further refine this work.
Michael Herz argues that agencies “construct” statutes after courts are
ﬁnished interpreting or “construing” them, and “interpretation has failed to
produce an answer.”83 Herz explains that Chevron “insists on respect for the
delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies, but it
preserves interpretive authority for courts.”84 The “court and the agency are
making diﬀerent sorts of decisions. The agency is making a policy decision.
By deﬁnition, within its Chevron space, the agency is unconstrained by the
statute, which has given out.”85
Herz follows the nineteenth century scholar Francis Lieber in suggesting
that interpretation is nothing more than discerning the meaning of words used
in a statute: “Interpretation [is] the narrower task, consisting of ‘the discovery
and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas.’”86
Construction, on the other hand, is the “drawing of conclusions respecting
subjects, that lie beyond the direct expression of the text, from elements known
from and given in the text—conclusions which are in the spirit, though not
within the letter of the text.”87 Herz argues that Lieber’s distinction “maps
tidily onto Chevron, particularly if step one is not especially capacious.”88 In
other words, once a court finishes understanding Congress’s meaning, it is
finished with interpretation and can move on to step two, which is construction.
Solum and Sunstein similarly argue that “there are actually two quite distinct
Chevron doctrines.”89 They write that interpretation is “about the linguistic
meaning of [a] term,” whereas construction deals with “the legal effect” of that
meaning “through implementation rules, specification, and other devices.”90
What they call “Chevron as Construction” involves no “deference to an agency’s
Herz, supra note 16.
Solum & Sunstein, supra note 16.
Herz, supra note 16, at 1883, 1891.
Id. at 1871.
Id. at 1881.
Id. at 1894 (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 5
(William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880)).
87 Id. (quoting LIEBER, supra note 87, at 44).
88 Id. at 1895.
89 Solum & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 3.
90 Id. at 3-4.
81
82
83
84
85
86
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view of the linguistic meaning of the statute,” but “insists on judicial deference
to agency action” only in the “construction zone.”91
The interpretation-construction distinction is useful, but it requires a
reﬁnement. In the ﬁrst place, it is not at all clear that the Founding generation
ever understood there to be a distinction between interpretation and
construction.92 Even if the distinction is real, both interpretation and
construction still appear to have been (and to remain) tasks for judges. The
judicial duty appears to have always entailed determining what legal eﬀect
the meanings of statutes have once placed within the context of the existing
corpus juris.93 For example, a statute that declares killing unlawful, but says
nothing about attempts, conspiracies, or self-defense, has no “meaning” with
respect to those other concepts. But judges would nevertheless give legal
eﬀect to those other concepts (assuming of course that they derive from some
source of law in the legal system) as part of applying the unlawful killing
statute.94 In other words, much of what qualiﬁes as “construction” may
actually historically be part of the judicial power.
Id. at 4-5.
Herz recognizes that historically, and still to this day, courts and commentators often use
the terms interchangeably, as if there is no distinction. Herz, supra note 16, at 1891-92. For an
originalist argument that the Framers did not distinguish between the two concepts, see John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and
the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 773 (2009).
93 As Will Baude and Stephen Sachs have explained, “Legislatures don’t change the law in a
vacuum. Like contracting parties, they act in a world already stuﬀed full of legal rules . . . . In our
system, at least, new enactments are designed to take their place in an existing corpus juris, as new
threads in a seamless web.” William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 1079, 1098 (2017). Thus, even once the “meaning” of a statute is clear, the question of legal
eﬀect is still one for judges: “How does [the legal enactment] ﬁt into the rest of the corpus juris?
What do ‘the legal sources and authorities, taken all together, establish’? Questions like these
presuppose some particular system of law, and their answers depend on the other legal rules in
place.” Id. at 1083 (cleaned up) (quoting 4 JOHN FINNIS, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
COLLECTED ESSAYS 1, 18 (2011)).
94 Id. at 1099-1100 (using another criminal statutory example). Baude and Sachs also describe
“the famous case of the two ships Peerless,” in which the two parties to a contract “agreed to send
cotton on the Peerless, unaware that there were two such ships sailing months apart (and that each
party had a diﬀerent ship in mind).” Id. at 1083. The court knows everything there is to know about
“meaning”—each party to the contract simply had in mind a diﬀerent ship. “Yet we still have to
decide the case,” and resolution will depend on those “other legal rules in place.” Id. At a minimum,
the very fact that Baude and Sachs titled their article “The Law of Interpretation,” whereas
everything they described Solum would, per a conversation I have recently had with him, label as
the “law of construction,” suggests that the interpretation-construction distinction is problematic.
Elsewhere Herz describes the distinction as follows: “In general, interpretation is the process
for resolving ambiguity; construction is the process for resolving vagueness.” Herz, supra note 16, at
1898. It is not clear to me that this distinction is correct, either, though it might be partly correct.
Insofar as “vagueness” involves the scope and reach of legal provisions, rather than their meaning,
that does appear to point more toward the speciﬁcation power, although courts may also have a role
in resolving vagueness using their traditional tools of construction. Insofar as vagueness points
toward the speciﬁcation power, it is at most a subset. The speciﬁcation power entails far more than
91
92

706

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 689

The specification power is a useful concept whatever one’s position on the
interpretation-construction distinction. Specification is a subset of construction
that could be described as a legislative or policymaking power. It is the power
over this subset of “construction” that the constitutional sources permit the
executive branch to exercise. Thus, one can believe that it is for the courts to
exercise power in most of the “construction zone,” while accepting that one piece
of that zone may nevertheless be equally suitable for the executive branch.95
II. INTERPRETATION AND SPECIFICATION
Executive officers routinely interpret law. They must determine for their own
purposes what the law means to implement and enforce it. This requires that they
be the first interpreters of the laws. But judges have their own constitutional duty
to decide what the law is when adjudicating actual cases and controversies, and
their judgment has historically been final and binding in those cases.
Yet there comes a point when the law runs out. The law may have nothing
more to say.96 A judge can conclude to the best of her own judgment that the
law simply does not require one alternative or another—that it leaves a gap
within which it is for an agency to specify the details. It turns out that such a
“speciﬁcation power” was often exercised in the early Republic. That is to be
expected: no law can ever specify every particular detail of implementation.
A. The Executive’s Incidental Interpretation Power
It has long been observed that administrative agencies and executive
departments must interpret law as an incident to enforce the law, and did so
resolving vagueness—it involves ﬁlling in statutory details when there is simply silence or a grant
of discretion, either of which may or may not involve vagueness.
95 Before Chevron became a landmark case, Ronald Levin provided a descriptive account of
judicial review of agency action very similar to the scheme I propose here. Levin argued that courts
should always exercise independent judgment over “questions of law,” but sometimes the best legal
interpretation of Congress’s enactments is that they delegate discretion to the agency. Ronald M.
Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1985). The court’s
role is always at a minimum to determine the scope of this delegation. Id. at 21 (“Delegations are
never unbounded. Identifying the restrictions that Congress imposed on its delegate is a form of
statutory interpretation and hence poses a ‘question of law.’” (footnote omitted)). Within the
discretionary space, “the agency is not interpreting the legislative will but, instead, responding to a
legislative invitation to make law.” Id. at 22. This account is consistent with the account presented
here, although the Chevron Court ultimately took deference in another direction. In addition to
reviving Levin’s pre-Chevron theoretical model and reﬁning it with a new vocabulary, my aim in the
next Parts is to support that model with historical antecedents and formalist constitutional theory.
96 As Justice Kagan recently said in the context of judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulation, a court must first “exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction,” but “the core
theory” of judicial deference “is that sometimes the law runs out, and policy-laden choice is what is left
over.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (citations omitted). That is exactly right. I would just
add: if the law has run out, then what is there to interpret?
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since the early years of the Republic. Early on Congress instructed heads of
departments “to superintend” the business of the various departments.97
When confronted with claims by individual customs collectors that the
requirement of their oath of oﬃce to execute their oﬃces “according to law”
required each collector to follow the law as each collector understood it,
Alexander Hamilton, as Treasury Secretary, instructed his collectors:
The power of superintending the collection of the revenue, as incident to the
duty of doing it, comprises, in my opinion, among a variety of particulars not
necessary to be speciﬁed, the right of settling, for the government of the
oﬃcers employed in the collection of the several branches of the revenue, the
construction of the laws relating to the revenue, in all cases of doubt.98

This power of construction was necessary lest “the most incongruous
practices upon the same laws might obtain in different districts of the United
States,” and was “essential to uniformity and system in the execution of the
laws.”99 Thus, over time, Hamilton instructed his collectors on several points
of law, including, for example, whether a vessel had to pay tonnage at each
entry and whether exports returned for lack of a foreign market was liable to
pay duties.100
Although the executive departments had to interpret law as an incident
to enforcement, they did not have the power of ﬁnal judgments. That is, the
executive could interpret the law for its purposes, but if a court confronted
that law through a case or controversy, the court would have ﬁnal say (at least
in that particular case) over what the law required. As Leonard White has
written, “[e]xcept for the withholding or revocation of a privilege,” no
sanction was “at the disposal of administrative oﬃcials,” not even the heads
of departments.101 “[P]enalties and forfeitures were imposed by [a] judge,”
which “gave the court opportunity to decide upon the legality and correctness

97 LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 204
(1948) (ﬁrst citing Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 65-66, then citing Act of Feb. 20, 1792,
ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 232, 234). Congress settled on the standard phrase, “subject to the superintendence,
control and direction of the department of the treasury, according to the authorities and duties of
the respective oﬃcers thereof.” Id. (quoting Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 47, § 4, 1 Stat. 376, 378).
98 Id. at 204-05 (quoting Revenue Circular from Alexander Hamilton to the Treasury
Department (July 20, 1792), in 3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 557-59 (John C.
Hamilton ed., 1850) [hereinafter Revenue Circular]).
99 Id. at 205 (quoting Revenue Circular, supra note 98, at 557-59), see also HAMBURGER, supra
note 38, at 89-90 (discussing the same letter).
100 WHITE, supra note 97, at 207. Whether any of these are more properly understood as
exercises of the speciﬁcation power will depend on a careful analysis of the statutes Hamilton was
implementing. This question is not necessary to resolve at this juncture.
101 Id. at 446.
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of oﬃcial action.”102 Even in Hamilton’s circular to his collectors in which he
explained the necessity of a centralized executive exposition of the laws, he
recognized that “a remedy, in a large proportion of the cases, might be
obtained from the courts of justice.”103 Or, as he wrote in The Federalist No.
78, “The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. . . . It therefore belongs to them to ascertain [the] meaning [of the
Constitution], as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from
the legislative body.”104
The Supreme Court confirmed early on that courts had final interpretive
authority over statutes, even though the interpretation of law requires discretion
on the part of the executive as well. In the 1840 case of Decatur v. Paulding,105 the
Court recognized that law-interpretation often left much room for discretion
and thus the Court would not compel the executive to adopt one interpretation
over another through a writ of mandamus.106 “[I]n the administration of the
various and important concerns of his office,” Chief Justice Taney wrote, the
head of a department “must exercise his judgment in expounding the laws and
resolutions of Congress, under which he is from time to time required to act.”107
The Court also noted, however, that should a case come before the Court in a
more traditional mode, it would be up to the Court to decide the law for itself.108
In a traditional non-mandamus case “which involved the construction of any of
these laws,” Chief Justice Taney wrote, “the Court certainly would not be bound
to adopt the construction given by the head of a department” because in such
cases it is the judges’ “duty to interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain
the rights of the parties in the cause before them.”109

102 Id. Jerry Mashaw conﬁrms this early history, and that ﬁnality of judgment was reserved for
courts in other administrative statutes as well. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 105 (2012) (noting that no penalties would be imposed upon a shipowner
“unless the U.S. Attorney for the district brought an action against the vessel or the owner and
prevailed on the merits.”); id. at 130 (“The statutes providing for land commission adjudication of
private claims made commission determinations ﬁnal against the United States, but not against third
party claimants. These latter claims would have to be fought out in the courts.”).
103 WHITE, supra note 97, at 205 (quoting Revenue Circular, supra note 99, at 557-59).
104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
105 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
106 Id. at 515.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. This element of the case is discussed in Bamzai, supra note 8, at 952. As explained,
although the courts did defer to executive interpretations of law, they did so only according to two
canons of statutory construction that aﬀorded weight to such interpretations if they were
contemporaneous with the enactment of the law itself, or were longstanding, in which case they
would be good evidence of what the law actually was. Id. at 916-17.
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Similarly, in United States v. Dickson, the Court pronounced that,
notwithstanding “the uniform construction” given to an act by the treasury
department for two decades:
[I]t is not to be forgotten, that ours is a government of laws, and not of men;
and that the Judicial Department has imposed upon it, by the Constitution,
the solemn duty to interpret the laws, in the last resort; and however
disagreeable that duty may be, in cases where its own judgment shall diﬀer
from that of other high functionaries, it is not at liberty to surrender, or to
waive it.110

In short, executive oﬃcers have, and always have had, an incidental power,
indeed a duty, to interpret the law in order to execute it. But this
interpretation power was only incidental, and it was not ﬁnal. The courts had
ﬁnal judgment over the interpretation of statutes at least in those cases and
controversies that came properly before them.111
B. The Executive’s Specification Power
Since the beginning of the Republic, the executive department has
exercised another power, one distinct in kind from the incidental executive
power of interpretation. This power has been referred to with diﬀerent
terminology. Jack Goldsmith and John Manning have recently suggested the
existence of a power similar to what is contemplated here, and referred to it
as the President’s “completion power.”112 It is a power that the early
administrative theorists described as the power to “express the will of the
state as to details where it is inconvenient for the legislature to act.”113 This is
the power that administrators exercise when the statutory requirements are
clear, but simply do not specify a course of action.114
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 162 (1841).
The separation of powers scholar M.J.C. Vile elegantly explains the diﬀerence between the
executive’s incidental power of interpretation, and the supreme interpretation power of the courts
in cases amenable to judicial review, as follows:
110
111

The diﬀerence between these [executive] interpretations and those of the judge,
however, is the authoritative quality of the judicial interpretation, whereas those of
other oﬃcials, although usually accepted as valid, are in principle subject to review.
The importance of this distinction cannot be lost sight of in the constitutional system
of government . . . .
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 360-61 (2d ed. 1998).
112 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2282.
113 FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 17 (1900).
114 The choice of the term “speciﬁcation” over “completion” might now be clearer. When the
executive exercises this power (whatever it is), it is not really “completing” the law, which most
assuredly remains incomplete. It has merely ﬁlled in a particular detail in a particular context where
the statute happened not to specify a particular course of action. When the executive acts to ﬁll this
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1. Early Examples
The instances of this power’s exercise in the early years of the Republic
are legion, and few raised any controversy. The ﬁrst collection act of 1789
directed only that shipowners keep manifests of their goods.115 This provision
of law was not ambiguous; it simply did not specify the course of action in
many details. It was left to Hamilton to create the forms and procedures to
be used at the Treasury, which included the precise form to be used for the
manifest of imported goods and merchandise by shipowners,116 the precise
form of the certiﬁcation of the manifests to be made by customs oﬃcials,117
the form to be used to report on spirits brought by the vessel,118 and many
other details of administration. Congress subsequently adopted these
procedures in the Collection Act of 1799.119
In 1798, Congress enacted legislation “to provide for the valuation of
Lands and Dwelling-Houses, and the enumeration of Slaves within the
United States.”120 This statute granted signiﬁcant discretion to the executive
branch to ﬁll in statutory details. The statute assigned existing counties to
various divisions for purposes of the act, and provided that if any new county
is formed out of two existing counties belonging to two diﬀerent divisions,
“then the commissioners to be appointed in pursuance of this act, shall
determine to which of such divisions it shall belong.”121 It also provided that
the ﬁrst meeting of the commissioners shall be “at such time and place as shall
be appointed and directed by the commissioner for each state, ﬁrst named
and qualiﬁed, according to this act.”122 The commissioners were empowered
“to divide their respective states into a suitable and convenient number of
assessment districts,” as well as to appoint a principal assessor and “such
number of respectable freeholders to be assistant assessors, as they shall judge
necessary for carrying this act into eﬀect,” provided that the Secretary of
Treasury had power to alter the number of districts and assessors.123 More
substantively, the commissioners were required “to establish all such
regulations” necessary to eﬀectuate the assessments, “[p]ursuant to which
regulations and instructions” the commissioners shall cause the assessors to
gap, it is specifying a particular course of action in a particular case; it cannot really be said to be
completing the statute, which might never cease requiring new speciﬁcations.
115 WHITE, supra note 97, at 206 (explaining that Hamilton ﬁrst devised these procedures); see
also Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 4, 10, 1 Stat. 29, 36, 38.
116 Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 23, 1 Stat. 627, 644–45.
117 Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 646–47.
118 Id. § 30, 1 Stat. at 649–51.
119 WHITE, supra note 97, at 206 & n.17 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627).
120 Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 70, 1 Stat. 580.
121 Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 580–83.
122 Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 584.
123 Id. § 7, 1 Stat. at 584–85.
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value and enumerate houses, lands, and slaves, according to the principles
established by Congress.124
Even where a statute was entirely silent, the executive sometimes ﬁlled in
details out of necessity. For example, the Treasury and other departments
created an entire class of disbursement personnel not speciﬁcally authorized
by law, but which these departments found necessary to ensure the proper
appropriation of funds for various activities.125 In another entertaining
example, Congress directed that surveyors mark the corners of townships
with trees; but “[n]ature was not so kind,” and subsequent regulations
permitted the use of stones.126
Jerry Mashaw has detailed numerous statutes, some only a single line long,
granting tremendous discretion to administrative agencies to ﬁll in statutory
details.127 One statute of particular interest provided that the military
pensions which had been granted and paid by the states pursuant to the acts
of the Confederation Congress to the wounded and disabled veterans of the
Revolutionary War “shall be continued and paid by the United States, from
the fourth day of March last, for the space of one year, under such regulations
as the President of the United States may direct.”128 President Washington’s
regulations stated that the sums owed were to be paid in “two equal
payments,” the ﬁrst on March 5, 1790, and the second on June 5, 1790; and
that each application for payment was to be accompanied by vouchers and
aﬃdavits aﬃrming that the invalid served in a particular regiment or vessel
at the time he was disabled.129
This is a particularly clear example of an executive oﬃcer exercising a
power not of interpretation, but of speciﬁcation. The regulation that the
payments were to be made in two equal payments three months apart was, to

Id. § 8, 1 Stat. at 585.
WHITE, supra note 97, at 340-41.
MASHAW, supra note 102, at 126.
In an early statute establishing post roads, Congress granted the Postmaster General “the
authority to provide for additional post roads and to decide where to set up post oﬃces,” and “full
authority to contract for the carriage of mail by whatever devices he thought ‘most expedient’ and
to prescribe regulations for his subordinates as he found necessary.” Id. at 46. Mashaw discusses
several other examples. Id. at 47 (noting that in the statute authorizing the Bank of the United
States, “all of the Bank’s operating policies—including when and where to establish branches—were
left to the regulations to be adopted by the Bank’s directors . . . .”); id. at 135 (explaining that
Congress gave authority to registers and receivers of land oﬃces to make corrections so long as
buyers provided “testimony satisfactory to the register and receiver of public moneys” (quoting Act
of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 98, 3 Stat. 526)); id. at 192 (describing how steamboat inspectors were “authorized
to adopt any means they thought necessary to test the suﬃciency of a steamboat or its equipment”).
128 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95.
129 These regulations are preserved in the Library of Congress, and can be viewed at An Act Providing
for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States, (Oct. 13, 1789), reprinted in LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.21201200/?st=text [https://perma.cc/R29C-C9SU].
124
125
126
127
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be sure, a reasonable interpretation of the statute, which required the
payments to be made within one year. Yet many other options were available:
daily installments for the entire year, or perhaps three installments at varying
intervals over the course of a year. Each of these options, in and of itself,
would have been a reasonable interpretation of the statute. In other words,
the result of the executive’s choice would have been a reasonable interpretation
of the statute, but the act of choosing among these various possible
interpretations was itself not an interpretive act. Nothing in the statute bore
on which regulation to choose. All of the options would have been reasonable
because all fell within the boundaries of the statute. Choosing among these
options was a pure matter of policy—an act of speciﬁcation.
2. Youngstown
Goldsmith and Manning argue that the President’s action in the
Youngstown steel seizure case may be best understood as an exercise of the
speciﬁcation (what they call completion) power.130 At the height of the
Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate steel mills subject to ongoing
labor disputes and nationwide strikes.131 The case assessing the validity of the
President’s action is often celebrated for Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion,
in which he oﬀered a three-part framework for assessing the lawfulness of an
exercise of executive power depending on whether Congress has authorized
that exercise of power, was silent with respect to it, or prohibited it.132
Goldsmith and Manning argue that Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent may
have had the better framework.133 In that dissent, Vinson noted that “[t]he
absence of a speciﬁc statute authorizing seizure of the steel mills as a mode
of executing the laws—both the military procurement program and the antiinﬂation program—has not until today been thought to prevent the President
130 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Goldsmith & Manning,
supra note 28, at 2282-87.
131 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583; Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 28, at 2283.
132 The three-part framework was stated as follows: (1) “When the President acts pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate”; (2) “[w]hen the President
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain,” and thus “any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law”; and (3) “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
133 See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2282.

2020]

The Specification Power

713

from executing the laws.”134 Numerous precedents “amply demonstrate[d]
that Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and protect the
country whether or not Congress happened to provide in advance for the
particular method of execution.”135 These precedents, according to Goldsmith
and Manning, are examples of “a completion power” that “enables the
President to go beyond (but not against) the implemental prescriptions of
particular statutes, when necessary to eﬀectuate the legislative program.”136
Goldsmith and Manning argue that the only limit on the President’s
power was the point at which “the executive’s actions implementing a statute
cross a line from something that is reasonably incidental to a statutory
command into something that looks more like new lawmaking.”137 This
analysis requires a modiﬁcation. An exercise of the speciﬁcation power may
not cross the line into “new lawmaking,” and yet it may still be unlawful
precisely because it goes beyond the statute. The range of options that may
be speciﬁed is still limited by the interpretation power. For this reason, my
sense is that President Truman’s action was still unlawful: no statute really
came close to giving him the power to seize the mills, and there was no real
“gap” to ﬁll at all. There was simply no law.138
Regardless of how Youngstown would come out under an analysis of the
speciﬁcation power, the upshot is simply that sometimes there is no more
interpretation to do, yet the statute still leaves “gaps” to ﬁll. Either through
an explicit grant of discretion or statutory silence, the executive has a power
to ﬁll in the details of the statutory scheme where the legislature could not
conveniently act or foresee all eventualities. The limit on the speciﬁcation
power is not the reasonableness of the agency’s exercise of interpretive power,
but rather the scope and breadth of the gap left by the statute as determined
by the interpretation power. The only other limits on the speciﬁcation power
are the nondelegation doctrine—the point at which the gap the executive is
seeking to ﬁll is simply too big—and the reasonableness requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.139

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 701-02 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 700.
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2285.
Id. at 2308.
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-86 (“There are two statutes which do authorize the
President to take both personal and real property under certain conditions. However, the
Government admits that these conditions were not met and that the President’s order was not rooted
in either of the statutes.” (footnote omitted)).
139 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2018) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, ﬁndings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”).
134
135
136
137
138
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3. An Analogy
At this point, the reader may not be convinced that the powers of
interpretation and speciﬁcation are really distinct. It may therefore be helpful
to draw an analogy that demonstrates that the distinction between
interpretation and speciﬁcation is common in ordinary human interactions.
Consider the following example. Suppose that two parents tell their children,
“Go make breakfast.” If the children serve up a plate of stones and leaves,
they have misinterpreted the instruction. Suppose now that they bring pizza
for breakfast instead. This may create a diﬃcult question, but it is an
interpretive question: is pizza the kind of thing we ordinarily consider to be
included in “breakfast”? Reasonable judges might disagree, but the question
is nevertheless an interpretive one—that is, whether pizza even falls within
the scope of the permissible options.140
Suppose the children are instead confronting the choice whether to make
eggs and bacon, waﬄes, or bagels. That choice involves no interpretation
whatsoever. Each of these options would fall within the meaning of breakfast,
and therefore fall within the scope of the permissible options. If pizza were
interpreted to be included within the meaning of breakfast, then the children
could add pizza for consideration, too—at least after a determination that it
falls within the meaning of breakfast. However, the choice among these
options, each of which would be a reasonable interpretation of the instruction,
is itself not an interpretive choice. It is a pure policymaking choice. The
children would be exercising discretion to “specify” the course of action
within the bounds of the parents’ instruction.
Although it is not always easy to see in complicated statutes, this
distinction between interpretation and speciﬁcation always exists, even if
judges do not always agree, as a matter of interpretation, whether an option
falls within the bounds of the permissible and is thus amenable to the
speciﬁcation power.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
As explained above, no previous work has provided a formalist account of
this speciﬁcation power. Goldsmith and Manning come closest to providing
such an account in their “completion power” article, but their account requires
140 This suggests my disagreement with Peter Strauss. Whereas Strauss’s “Chevron space”
exists between the zone where the statute clearly permits an action and the zone where it clearly
prohibits an action, see Strauss, supra note 12, at 1161-65, the space between these zones of clarity
may still call for interpretation. See also, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 843, 845 (2016) (arguing that in matters of constitutional interpretation judges have the
duty to “use the ample methods of clariﬁcation available to clarify the precise meaning of the
Constitution”).
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further reﬁnement. First, like the rest of the literature, they treat
“interpretation” and “completion” as the same, and therefore are unable to
resolve the Article III problem.141 Second, their argument in favor of the
completion power rests largely on Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent in
Youngstown; they give only cursory analysis to the Constitution’s text and
structure.142 This Part supplies the constitutional argument from the text and
structure of both the legislative-power and executive-power provisions of the
Constitution, thereby supporting a formalist or originalist case for deference
of a certain sort. This approach should also appeal to the adherents of other
contemporary methods of constitutional interpretation that also value textual
and historical arguments.143
A. Nonexclusive Legislative Power
Wayman v. Southard,144 the Court’s ﬁrst major nondelegation case,145 is the
ﬁrst source of constitutional support for the speciﬁcation power. In that case,
Chief Justice John Marshall elaborated upon the meaning of the grant of
“legislative power” to Congress in the Constitution. The 1792 Process Act at
issue in Wayman established that the practices prevailing in each respective
state supreme court as of 1789, respecting “the forms of writs and executions”
and the “modes of process . . . in suits at common law,” would govern in

141

The authors argue that
[t]he Chevron doctrine appears to reﬂect the idea that while Congress can legitimately
give either courts or agencies ultimate authority to resolve statutory ambiguities or ﬁll
up statutory interstices, it is more consistent with the background premises of our
constitutional democracy to embrace a default rule that Congress prefers to leave such
completion power in the hands of the more accountable executive.

Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2299 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
142 They brieﬂy argue that this completion power may inhere in either the Vesting Clause or
the Take Care Clause, but ultimately rely on an analogy to the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at
2303-06. They note that there are reasons why such a clause might have been included in Article I,
without the negative implication that therefore there is no similar implied power in Article II (or
Article III). Id. at 2306.
143 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, A Nonoriginalism for Originalists, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1443, 1445-46
(2016) (noting that under a “pluralistic or eclectic approach to constitutional interpretation,”
interpreters “use multiple modes of inquiry, including those based on constitutional text, history,
and structure, on legal and political precedent, or on practical consequences, without necessarily
privileging any one in particular”).
144 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
145 An earlier case, Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, in which the Court upheld
Congress’s conditioning of the existence of an embargo on a presidential ﬁnding of non-neutrality
among foreign states, is also taken as a nondelegation case. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 383, 388 (1813).
It is not particularly controversial, however, and the Court did not give any sustained treatment to
a nondelegation principle.
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federal court proceedings in those states.146 The statute included a proviso:
subject to the rules and regulations prescribed by the federal courts.147 The
nondelegation question in Wayman (which the Court did not even have to
decide148) was whether this proviso was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the courts.
The plaintiﬀ in Wayman had sought an execution of judgment against the
defendant in hard currency.149 The defendant sought the application of a 1792
Kentucky law providing that a plaintiﬀ must accept state paper currency in
satisfaction of a judgment.150 The Court agreed with the plaintiﬀ that the 1792
Kentucky law did not govern in a federal court suit at common law because
the federal acts provided that only those state practices established as of 1789
applied.151 The defendant then pressed a nondelegation argument: the 1792
Process Act for the governing of process and suits at common law would be
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in light of its proviso, if
that proviso were interpreted to extend to matters outside of courtroom
proceedings and to the manner of executions. Thus, Congress could not have
146

Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 27. The statute enacted the following:
That the forms of writs, executions, and other process, except their style and the forms
and modes of proceeding in suits in those of common law, shall be the same as are now
used in the said Courts respectively, in pursuance of the act entitled, ‘An act to regulate
processes in the courts of the United States,’ . . . except so far as may have been
provided for by the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States; subject
however to such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively shall in their
discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court of the United
States shall think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district
court concerning the same.

Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872); Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 31. The “act”
referred to in the quoted statute above was the 1789 Act providing that “the forms of writs and executions,
except their style, and modes of process . . . , in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall
be the same in each state respectively, as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.” Act of
Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1872); Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 26-27.
147 The process prescribed was subject to “such alterations and additions as the said Courts
respectively shall, in their discretion, deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme Court
of the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule, to prescribe to any Circuit or
District Court concerning the same.” Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 31.
148 The Court noted,
But the question respecting the right of the Courts to alter the modes of proceeding
in suits at common law, established in the Process Act, does not arise in this case. That
is not the point on which the Judges at the circuit were divided, and which they have
adjourned to this Court. The question really adjourned is, whether the laws of
Kentucky respecting executions, passed subsequent to the Process Act, are applicable
to executions which issue on judgments rendered by the Federal Courts?
Id. at 48-49.
149 Id. at 2.
150 Id. at 2-3.
151 Id. at 32, 41.
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intended for it to reach outside the courtroom to the manner in which a
judgment was executed.152 Indeed, a regulation requiring the acceptance of
state bank notes aﬀected not only how one would be divested of property, but
also of how much property.153
The Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that the law did in fact
reach to matters outside of courtroom procedures to all “‘proceedings in suits’
at common law,” including execution of judgments.154 Chief Justice Marshall
proceeded to address the nondelegation argument. He wrote: “It will not be
contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals,
powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully
exercise itself.”155 The Judiciary Act and the Process Act “empower the Courts
respectively to regulate their practice,” and “[i]t certainly will not be contended,
that this might not be done by Congress.”156 Yet it also “will not be contended”
that “mak[ing] rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing
of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same
description . . . may not be conferred on the judicial department.”157
“The line has not been exactly drawn,” Chief Justice Marshall continued,
“which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated
by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such
general provisions to fill up the details.”158 In other words, the power to make
rules “ﬁll[ing] up the details” of a general legislative provision is a kind of
nonexclusive legislative power, a power partly but not wholly legislative in
character and which Congress can exercise itself but which it can also confer
on one of the other departments.
152
153

Id. at 13-17, 42.
See id. at 32, 42. According to the reporter, defendant’s counsel had argued:
All the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress. Supposing Congress to
have power, under the clause, for making all laws necessary and proper, &c. to make
laws for executing the judicial power of the Union, it cannot delegate such power to
the judiciary. The rules by which the citizen shall be deprived of his liberty or property,
to enforce a judicial sentence, ought to be prescribed and known; and the power to
prescribe such rules belongs exclusively to the legislative department.

Id. at 13-14.
Indeed, some scholars have argued that, because this rule would have deprived an individual of private
property, it ought to be considered exclusively legislative and nondelegable, contrary to Marshall’s dictum
that we shall soon encounter. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 38, at 393. That may be correct, and for
present purposes it does not matter whether Marshall’s dictum in this respect is correct.
154 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 36.
155 Id. at 42-43.
156 Id. at 43.
157 Id.
158 Id. (emphasis added).
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Chief Justice Marshall then assessed whether the power delegated by the
proviso was an impermissible delegation—that is, whether it fell within the
class of powers that was “exclusively legislative.” He observed that the Act
permitted the courts to specify where the executive officer might keep the
goods of the debtor until the day of sale; to specify how notice is to be given
before the execution of a judgment; and to specify whether the sale can be
made on credit.159 Chief Justice Marshall thus recognized that a broad
statutory provision might call for an exercise of what we have called the
“specification” power to fill in interstitial legislative details, where there was no
more interpretation to be done. Because it is quite impossible for Congress to
anticipate every detail of implementation, there must exist this class of
nonexclusive legislative power “to fill up the details” of a statutory scheme.160
B. The Prerogative Specification Power
Although the Process Act of 1792 explicitly delegated the power to the
courts to “specify” particular details of that law, there may be other sources
of constitutional power for the executive to specify at least certain kinds of
details even in the absence of an explicit delegation to make regulations. The
ﬁrst possible source is the Take Care Clause; the second, more likely source
is the Vesting Clause.
A speciﬁcation power could inhere in the President’s duty to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed, assuming this textual provision is also a grant
of power. If Congress left a detail to be speciﬁed, even if it did so
unknowingly and even if it did not explicitly grant the executive the power
to make regulations, how are executive oﬃcers to execute the laws faithfully
without providing for that detail of implementation? This is what we
ordinarily mean when we say a statute has a “gap.” In Chevron itself, the
agency was required to regulate “stationary sources.”161 To execute this
Id. at 44-46.
This view is also consistent with Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis in Marbury, where he
argued that where a statute (or the Constitution) gave the President discretion to act, such discretion
was generally not examinable by a court; only where a statute gave more speciﬁc instructions were
the President’s actions pursuant to such statute examinable by the courts. Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, said:
159
160

The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments . . . merely . . . act
in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific
duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to
the laws of his country for a remedy.
Id.
161

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859-62 (1984).
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instruction, the agency had to decide what to consider as a stationary source
when more than one of the statutory deﬁnitions applied.162 This gap had to
be ﬁlled, in other words, for the law to be faithfully executed.
John Marshall, this time as a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1800, hinted that such a speciﬁcation power belonged to
the executive even absent an explicit delegation from Congress. Commenting
on the enforcement of a treaty and the President’s duty “to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed,” Marshall wrote that Congress may
unquestionably “prescribe the mode” by which the President is to execute the
treaty, but, he added, “till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive
department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.”163
Chief Justice Vinson, for his part, surveyed the historical sources in his
Youngstown dissent and concluded that such precedents “amply demonstrate[]
that Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and protect the
country whether or not Congress happened to provide in advance for the
particular method of execution.”164
Because the Take Care Clause may not even be a grant of power, the Vesting
Clause is the more likely source of the specification power.165 There is a debate
in the executive power literature over the precise meaning of “the executive
power” vested in the President, and the structure of Article II more broadly.
Michael McConnell reflects and refines the prevailing formalist account in a
recent study and argues that all historically executive powers are vested in the
executive department, subject to express limitations elsewhere in the text.166
The Vesting Clause vests the President with all the executive powers,167 but the
various executive-prerogative powers listed in Blackstone were then distributed
across the national government.168 For example, the Constitution grants
Id.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 684 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 614 (1800)).
164 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
165 The Take Care Clause is written as a duty—a limitation on how the law is to be executed—
and therefore seems not to be a grant of power.
166 Michael McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King (unpublished manuscript)
(on ﬁle with author).
167 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . .”), with id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States . . . .”).
168 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 166, at 55-56. McConnell writes that William Crosskey
“was the ﬁrst to note that the enumeration of powers by the Committee of Detail was as much about
legislative-executive separation of powers as it was about federalism.” Id. at 46; see also 1 WILLIAM
WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 466 (1953), describing Congress’s
162
163

making a threefold division of power within the new national government, and . . .
vest[ing] in Congress many . . . ‘executive’ powers . . . [which] were much more
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Congress the historically prerogative powers over war and peace, letters of
marque and reprisal, and coining money (among other such powers);169 it
grants the Senate a say in the appointment and treaty powers;170 and it grants
courts equity jurisdiction.171 If the specification power is a prerogative power
not limited elsewhere in the text, then it is vested in the executive.172
The executive in Britain was historically understood to have a kind of
speciﬁcation power. Both John Locke and William Blackstone describe a
prerogative power to ﬁll in legislative details as an incident to enforcement
even in the absence of explicit legislative direction. Locke wrote that because
legislators are not “able to foresee, and provide, by Laws, for all, that may be
useful to the Community,” the executive has a power to exercise a legislative
power “in many Cases, where the municipal Law has given no direction, till
the Legislative can conveniently be Assembled to provide for it.”173 Locke
goes on to say that because the lawmaking body is too numerous and slow and
not always in being, “and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by
laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concern the
publick,” there is therefore “a latitude left to the Executive power, to do many
things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe.”174 The prerogative power,
in other words, “can be nothing, but the Peoples permitting their Rulers, to
do several things of their own free choice, where the Law was silent . . . .”175

important determinants of the particular enumeration of Congressional powers . . .
than was the desire of making clear the powers which Congress was to have, and the
powers which it was not to have, as against the states.
See also generally id. at 415-28, 429-32, 454, 464-66 (discussing the English executive-prerogative powers
and the division of the powers across the three federal branches in the United States Constitution).
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
170 Id. art. II, § 2.
171 Id. art. III, § 2.
172 In the “Decision of 1789,” Congress seems to have adopted this view of Article II. James
Madison argued that
[t]he constitution aﬃrms, that the executive power shall be vested in the President.
Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there are. The constitution says, that in
appointing to oﬃce, the Senate shall be associated with the President, unless in the
case of inferior oﬃcers . . . . Have we a right to extend this exception? I believe not.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 481 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison). See also id. at
516 (statement of Rep. Madison) (“[T]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States. The association of the Senate with the President in exercising that particular function, is an
exception to this general rule; and exceptions to general rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken strictly.”).
173 JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government § 159, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 392 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1690).
174 Id. § 160 at 393.
175 Id. § 164 at 395.
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Locke then adds, contrary to Blackstone (see below), that sometimes this
power can go against “the direct Letter of the Law, for the publick good.”176
Blackstone, whose work heavily inﬂuenced the Founders,177 described a
prerogative power more along the lines presented here. “For, though the
making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part, the legislative branch,
of the sovereign power,” wrote Blackstone, “yet the manner, time, and
circumstances of putting those laws in execution must frequently be left to
the discretion of the executive magistrate.”178 Therefore, the executive’s edicts
or proclamations on these points (its executive orders and regulations) “are
binding upon the subject, where they do not either contradict the old laws, or
tend to establish new ones; but only enforce the execution of such laws as are
already in being, in such manner as the king shall judge necessary.”179 If this
power to specify the details necessary to enforce a law is a prerogative power,
as Blackstone seems to describe, then it is vested in the executive department
because such a power is not otherwise limited by the constitutional text.
For what it is worth, I am not convinced that the standard formalist
account is correct. As Julian Mortenson has written in two recent and
important papers, one forthcoming in the pages of this law review, historically
“the executive power” was likely understood to refer only to law-execution
and not to all of the King’s prerogative powers.180 I think Mortenson is
probably right. But, as I am developing in another work, even on the law
execution account of the Vesting Clause there may be a “thick” version of “the
executive power” that plausibly includes the powers to appoint, control, and
remove executive oﬃcers and, perhaps, Blackstone’s proclamation power.181
Blackstone describes this power under the same heading under which he
discusses “the executive power of the laws,” and states that this proclamation

Id.
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593-94 (2008) (noting that
Blackstone’s works “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding
generation” (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)); CROSSKEY, supra note 168, at 416
(describing the Constitution’s distribution of prerogative powers listed in Blackstone); Gary L.
McDowell, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Recovering the Intentions of the Founders, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 626, 640 (1999) (calling Blackstone the “most dominant source of authority on the common
law for those who wrote and ratiﬁed the Constitution”). But see generally Martin Jordan Minot, Note,
The Irrelevance of Blackstone: Rethinking the Eighteenth-Century Importance of the Commentaries, 104
VA. L. REV. 1359 (2018) (arguing that Blackstone was far less inﬂuential on the Founders than is
commonly believed).
178 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261.
179 Id.
180 Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1169-70 (2019); Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 168 U.
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2020).
181 See Ilan Wurman, In Search of Prerogative (Oct. 28, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3472108 [https://perma.cc/YW56-BKDB].
176
177
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power extends simply to the “manner, time, and circumstances of putting
those laws in execution”182 and to “enforce the execution of such laws as are
already in being.”183 Thus, even if “the executive power” refers only to the
power to carry into execution preexisting laws, that power very well may
include this proclamation power.
One ﬁnal observation may be useful. The precise scope of the
speciﬁcation power may vary depending on its source. The scope of the
executive’s inherent speciﬁcation power may not be commensurate with the
scope of the speciﬁcation power expressly delegated by Congress. There may
be details of implementation that are impermissible for the executive to enact
in the absence of such a delegation. Blackstone’s description of a power to
implement the “manner, time, and circumstances” of enforcement may not
entail, for example, the power to create interstitial rules that aﬀect the legal
rights of individuals. It may, on the other hand, be permissible for Congress
to delegate the power to the executive to specify such details, depending on
one’s theory of delegation. To be sure, if it is impermissible altogether for
Congress to make such a delegation—if the making of any rule, no matter
how minor or interstitial, that aﬀects private rights or conduct is an exercise
of “exclusively” legislative power—then there may be no variance between
the scope of the speciﬁcation power rooted in the executive power clause and
the scope of the speciﬁcation power rooted in legislative delegation. For our
purposes, the important point is that whatever the precise scope and limits of
the speciﬁcation power when rooted in these diﬀerent constitutional sources,
such a power exists.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This Part revisits the debates with which this Article began, and shows
how they can be advanced or at least clariﬁed. It shows how several of the
Court’s rationales in Chevron are unsupportable, but some are valid as to the
speciﬁcation power. Finally, it discusses the limitations of the present
argument, and ends with a footnote on the nondelegation doctrine. All told,
properly distinguishing between executive interpretation and speciﬁcation
allows us to understand how judges would operate in a world without Chevron
deference. They would resolve for themselves all matters of interpretation,
including ambiguities; but where the statute, on its best reading, leaves a gap
to be ﬁlled, the judges would permit the executive to specify the details within
the limits of such gaps.

182
183

BLACKSTONE, supra note 178, at *261.
Id.
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A. Judging in a World Without Chevron
1. Advancing the Debates
In their article on the completion power, Goldsmith and Manning write
that the completion power may justify Chevron deference notwithstanding the
apparent violation of Article III and the APA. In light of such hurdles, it
“remains necessary to identify a legal justification” for why “Congress would
prefer agencies rather than courts to have binding authority to resolve residual
ambiguities.”184 According to them, the best explanation for Chevron “is that
executive branch officials are endowed with presumptive constitutional
authority, grounded in Article II, to complete an ambiguous statutory scheme
unless Congress specifies otherwise.”185 Yet, if the powers of interpretation and
completion (or specification) are in fact distinct, as argued here, no legal
justification is necessary. The courts need not, and cannot consistently with
Article III, defer to an agency’s exercise of the interpretation power. But the
courts certainly can defer to the executive’s constitutionally rooted
specification or interstitial lawmaking power. It would not even be appropriate
to call it “deference,” because judges would simply have no authority in this
domain except to ensure that the agency stays within the limits of the gap
created by the statute and does not act arbitrarily and capriciously.186
Moreover, Goldsmith and Manning treat “resolv[ing] residual
ambiguities” as tantamount to the completion power, as they do elsewhere.187
Others have similarly argued that resolving statutory ambiguities should be
treated as an exercise of policymaking rather than interpretation.188 But
neither Goldsmith and Manning, nor these other scholars, defend this view;
none provides an argument for why the resolution of ambiguities is in fact an
exercise of policymaking discretion rather than interpretation. To be sure,
they very well might be the same power if one adopts the legal realist view
that all interpretive power inherently entails lawmaking.
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2301 (footnote omitted).
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2018) (stating that reviewing courts are to “hold unlawful and set
aside agency actions . . . found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law”).
187 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2301. For example, they write:
184
185
186

The Chevron doctrine appears to reﬂect the idea that while Congress can legitimately
give either courts or agencies ultimate authority to resolve statutory ambiguities or ﬁll
up statutory interstices, it is more consistent with the background premises of our
constitutional democracy to embrace a default rule that Congress prefers to leave such
completion power in the hands of the more accountable executive.
Id. at 2299 (emphasis added).
188 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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If one rejects that view, then resolving genuine “ambiguity,” as opposed to
specifying the details within statutory gaps where the statute is otherwise clear,
is most likely an exercise of the interpretation power. Determining the meaning,
scope, and application of a statutory command is a quintessential interpretive
task on the pre-realist understanding. Although there is some literature
suggesting different possible meanings of “ambiguity”189—and, as explained
here, ambiguity is often conflated with other concepts such as gaps or
silences190—at a minimum ambiguity entails the proposition that a particular
linguistic command is susceptible to more than one meaning in a particular
context.191 And ascertaining the legal effect of statutes in light of ambiguous
meaning has always been understood to be a judicial task.192 Resolving
ambiguities, in other words, is up to the judge: she must decide whether “pizza”
is included within “breakfast.” But once she decides that it is, the choice of
whether to go with pizza or something else is a matter of specification.193
Bednar and Hickman’s claim that Chevron is “inevitable” can now also be
clariﬁed. When they write that calls for Chevron’s demise “fail to take into
account that Chevron deference, or something much like it, is a necessary
consequence of and corollary to Congress’s longstanding habit of relying on
agencies to exercise substantial policymaking discretion to resolve statutory
details,”194 that proposition need no longer be objectionable to Chevron
189 See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV.
791, 799-802 (2010) (describing numerous academic approaches to deﬁning “ambiguity”).
190 For instance, Professor Siegel, in his recent defense of Chevron, stated that the power
conferred by a statutory ambiguity “should not be regarded as interpretive power, but as the power
to make a policy choice.” Siegel, supra note 12, at 965. Siegel does not defend this view, however,
and as explained, it seems that it can only be sustained by the legal realist position that all acts of
interpretation inherently entail lawmaking. See supra note 12. Moreover, if resolving ambiguities is
not an interpretive task, then it is unclear what exactly is left for interpretation at all—other than
enforcing the clear textual meaning of a statute in noncontroversial cases. Almost all statutes are
ambiguous in some respects and interact with a dizzying array of other statutes within the legal
system. If courts were simply left to police the outer boundaries of statutes where they are
unquestionably clear, that would certainly seem to work a major transfer of power from the courts
to agencies. And if some ambiguities are amenable to resolution by courts and others not, one needs
an account of such a distinction. That is the account this Article seeks to provide—by distinguishing
between genuine ambiguities on the one hand, and gaps or silences on the other hand that call for
exercises of the speciﬁcation rather than interpretation power.
191 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65,
67 (2011) (“Ambiguity refers to words that have more than one sense or meaning. Vagueness refers to
the penumbra or borderline of a word’s meaning, where it may be unclear whether a certain object
is included within it or not.”).
192 See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 178, at *60 (noting that as part of the interpretation of
laws, judges ﬁrst look to the usual signiﬁcation of words, but if the “words happen to be still dubious,
we may establish their meaning from the context,” and also from the “subject-matter” of the statute
and the “eﬀects and consequence” of the signiﬁcation of the words).
193 See supra subsection II.C.3.
194 Bednar & Hickman, supra note 10, at 1398.
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skeptics. The executive branch has long exercised discretion pursuant to its
executive power to ﬁll in statutory details where it was inconvenient for the
legislative branch to act, either as an incident to enforcing the law or where
Congress has explicitly delegated its nonexclusive legislative power to ﬁll in
such details. The skeptics can still call for an end to deference to executive
interpretation, while recognizing that courts have a limited role in policing
the outer boundaries of executive speciﬁcation.195
To be sure, lower-order disagreements will exist over whether an agency
action falls within the permissible bounds of the statute and is thus a proper
exercise of speciﬁcation, or whether it is a misinterpretation of the statute
because it falls outside the permissible. Even if diﬀerent judges might come
to diﬀerent conclusions, however, the issue is not whether interpretation is
an error-free or disagreement-free exercise. The question is who has the
power to decide, even in the face of possible errors and disagreements. Article
III assigns this task to life-tenured and salary-protected judges so that they
are insulated from the political accountability that might otherwise justify
Chevron deference. Yet these judges might use all their reasoning and legal
resources and conclude that the statute simply does not require one answer
or another, and therefore it is left to the executive to specify the details with
its Article II powers.
Put another way, in every case a judge should be able to distinguish
between interpretation and speciﬁcation. Judges may disagree, to be sure, on
what falls within the range of the speciﬁcation power in a given case because
they might disagree on the best interpretation of the statute and thus disagree
on the scope of the policymaking space left for the agency.
2. Revisiting Chevron and Its Predecessors
Rereading Chevron in light of the above analysis reveals that the Court in
that seminal case also conﬂated interpretation and speciﬁcation. Chevron
involved the decision of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under
the Reagan Administration to interpret “stationary source” in the Clean Air
Act to refer to an entire plant rather than to any individual emitting source
within that plant (this was called the “bubble” policy).196 The bubble policy
permitted plants to fall below certain regulatory standards with respect to
individual sources of emissions so long as there were oﬀsetting reductions in
emissions in other parts of the plant.197 The Act’s statutory deﬁnition
plausibly could refer either to any individual installation within a plant, or to
195 They would still review executive speciﬁcation to ensure the agency’s choices are not
arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2018).
196 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 859-62 (1984).
197 Id. at 853-55.
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the plant as a whole. The Act deﬁned stationary source as “any building,
structure, facility, or installation” which emits air pollution.198
The Court deferred to the agency’s choice and oﬀered numerous
rationales. On the one hand the Court suggested that “[w]e have long
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,
and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”199 The
Court, in other words, assumed the agency’s exercise of power was one of lawinterpretation. “In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”200
On the other hand, the Court also argued that “[t]he power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to ﬁll
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,” and “[i]f Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to ﬁll, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a speciﬁc provision of the statute by
regulation.”201 Later on, the Court appears to conﬂate these ideas in the same
sentence, noting for example that “[w]hen a challenge to an agency
construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on
the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail” because
“[i]n such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”202 Thus, the Court
held that the EPA’s choice was “a permissible construction of the statute.”203
Properly understood, the Court in Chevron was not concerned with
interpretation. The statute seemed to call rather for specification. A judge can
stare at the statute all she wants, and it still defines a stationary source as “any
building, structure, facility, or installation” which emits air pollution. What is a
judge to do when there is a facility with multiple structures and installations—that
is, when more than one of these definitions might apply? The statute is not
ambiguous as to which is a stationary source; the Act says that they all can be so
considered. The meaning of the statute, in other words, is clear. The statute simply
does not answer which of these definitions to adopt when more than one applies.
No matter how much one stares at this statute, even with its structure and
198 Id. at 859 (quoting Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 4(a), 111(a)(3),
84 Stat. 1676, 1683 (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2018)).
199 Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 231 (1974)).
202 Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
203 Id.
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purposes in mind, it does not appear to answer the question; it is a gap in the
statute within which it is left to the agency to specify the details.
Earlier deference cases similarly seem to have contemplated speciﬁcation
rather than interpretation. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,204 for
example, which is often considered to be a predecessor to Chevron,205 the
majority of the Court did not appear to defer to the executive’s interpretation
of the National Labor Relations Act. Hearst argued that “[b]ecause Congress
did not explicitly deﬁne the term [employee], . . . its meaning must be
determined by reference to common-law standards.”206 This was crucial:
courts historically had not only an interpretation power, but a common-law
lawmaking function akin to speciﬁcation. It is this function that the Court
appeared willing to give to the administrative agencies, not ﬁnal authority
over interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation “are for the courts
to resolve,” the Court noted, “especially when arising in the ﬁrst instance in
judicial proceedings.”207 But the reviewing court’s function is more “limited”
where the question is instead “one of speciﬁc application of a broad statutory
term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must
determine it initially.”208
In other words, broad terms call not for interpretation, but rather the
speciﬁcation of details.209 That is because broad statutory terms like
“unreasonable” or “unfair” or “fair and equitable” obviously include a large
number of possibilities. But in and of themselves, they rarely answer the
question of which of the possibilities to choose.
3. Objections, and a Note on Judicial Power
Formalists might reject the present thesis on the ground that what it has
described as speciﬁcation was historically considered part of interpretation.
Justice Thomas has argued that if deference is justiﬁed on the basis of
legislative delegations from Congress, then that, too, violates the

322 U.S. 111 (1944).
See, e.g., Bamzai, supra note 8, at 918 & n.27; Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of
Administrative Action: A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2011).
206 Hearst, 322 U.S. at 120.
207 Id. at 130-31.
208 Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
209 To be sure, it can still be disputed whether the statute actually had more to say on the
meaning of the term “employee.” Justice Roberts in a separate opinion argued that “[t]he question
who is an employee, so as to make the statute applicable to him, is a question of the meaning of the
Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative question.” Id. at 136 (Roberts, J., concurring
in the judgment). But this view seems to conﬂate the historical judicial powers of interpretation and
common-law lawmaking, i.e. the judicial interpretation and speciﬁcation powers, the latter of which
is also appropriate for the executive branch.
204
205
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Constitution for Article I reasons.210 But there is no doubt that whether the
courts’ activities were called interpretation, this historical judicial power
entailed signiﬁcant power to fashion rules in the absence of law from
Congress. That is, courts historically exercised an interstitial, common-law
legislative power, which they still exercise to at least some degree to this
day.211 That much of the legal realist critique formalists really ought to
accept.212 And Congress can, of course, revise the federal common law by
legislation, a power it does not have over judicial decisions.213 If Congress
could have obviated the need for this interstitial lawmaking power by
legislating in more detail—and if, as this Article has aimed to show, the
executive has always had a power to specify the details of a legislative
program—then there is nothing about the modern transference of this
speciﬁcation power from courts to agencies that is inconsistent with the
original constitutional design.
From the other side, the legal realists might still object that all acts of
interpretation are really acts of policymaking. That view, however, is
inconsistent with the Founders’ design and their understanding of the
separation of powers. “However difficult it may be to determine with
precision the exact boundaries of the Legislative and Executive powers,”
James Madison once exhorted his colleagues in the House of
Representatives,214 there are still genuine lines dividing legislative,
executive, and judicial powers. Our entire constitutional system depends on
there being such boundaries.
210 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]f we give
the ‘force of law’ to agency pronouncements on matters of private conduct as to which Congress did
not actually have an intent, we permit a body other than Congress to perform a function that requires
an exercise of the legislative power.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
211 See, e.g., Clearﬁeld Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (“In absence of an
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according
to their own standards.”); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (observing that when federal courts decide questions that “cannot be answered from
federal statutes alone,” they may “resort to all of the source materials of the common law,” which
“follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes”); Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding that the federal courts have the power, on “questions of a
more general nature” such as “the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments,
and especially to questions of general commercial law,” to ascertain “what is the just rule furnished
by the principles of commercial law to govern the case”).
212 But see generally Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527 (arguing that it is
plausible to have a legal system in which judges ﬁnd law).
213 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1871) (holding that Congress may not
“prescribe rules of decision” to particular cases, but can amend legislation to create “new
circumstances” which the court will then apply its “ordinary rules” to).
214 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 238 (1791) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
at 700 (1792) (“Mr. Madison saw some diﬃculty in drawing the exact line between subjects of
legislative and ministerial deliberations, but still such a line most certainly existed.”).
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What this Article has proposed is that the Founders’ view can be accepted
without completely rejecting what the legal realists had to offer. They were
right that historically judges exercised a kind of interstitial lawmaking power,
and that often Congress explicitly leaves such power to the exercise of the
executive branch. It does not follow, however, that all acts of interpretation are
inherently lawmaking. The Founders may not have had the final word on the
separation of powers, but that hardly means there are no limits demarcating the
boundaries between the separate powers they identified.
Finally, as a historical matter, judges often looked to statutory purposes
and policy considerations in arriving at their judgments of what a statute
required.215 The distinction between interpretation and speciﬁcation does not
necessarily require a judge to abandon purpose in arriving at what the judge
believes to be the best reading of a statute. It does require, however, the
recognition that matters of policy often call for speciﬁcation by the agency.
At least that much is justiﬁed by the modern shift from common-law to
administrative regulation.216
B. Enforcing Nondelegation (As-Applied)
As explained, speciﬁcation is bounded by interpretation: courts must
determine as a matter of interpretation the scope of the permissible, which is
then subject to the speciﬁcation power. There may be another limit, however,
on an agency’s exercise of the speciﬁcation power: the nondelegation
doctrine. There may come a point at which the “speciﬁcation” of a legislative
detail transgresses the boundary between mere speciﬁcation, which is a
nonexclusive legislative power, and exclusively legislative power that
Congress must exercise.
In an earlier Article, I argued that the courts could make the
nondelegation doctrine workable by refashioning it to be a more modest, asapplied nondelegation doctrine.217 The idea was to treat each statutory
ambiguity the same way Chevron does, as an implicit delegation of power

215

Justice Scalia noted this:
Surely one of the most frequent justiﬁcations courts give for choosing a particular
construction is that the alternative interpretation would produce “absurd” results, or
results less compatible with the reason or purpose of the statute. This, it seems to me,
unquestionably involves judicial consideration and evaluation of competing policies,
and for precisely the same purpose for which (in the context we are discussing here)
agencies consider and evaluate them—to determine which one will best eﬀectuate the
statutory purpose.

Scalia, supra note 33, at 515.
216 Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2591.
217 Ilan Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 977 (2018).
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from Congress to the agency to resolve that ambiguity. The as-applied
nondelegation doctrine would then assess each implicit delegation of
authority for potential nondelegation violations.218 Thus, the incoherence of
the major questions cases would be resolved because the Court could honestly
ﬁnd ambiguity yet hold that the regulation, rather than the statute, violates
the Constitution as an impermissible legislative act made pursuant to an
impermissible implicit delegation of authority from Congress.219
The distinction between interpretation and speciﬁcation clariﬁes this
framework, which can replace the Chevron framework altogether. When
judges confront an ambiguous statute, they must do all the interpretation they
can to resolve what the statute, according to their own judgments, requires.
But after exercising this judgment, the judges might conclude that the statute
simply does not answer the question at hand—it leaves, either explicitly or
implicitly, a gap for the agency to ﬁll. The as-applied nondelegation doctrine
then polices this speciﬁcation power for impermissible delegations. The
executive can specify the details within the discretion granted by a statute,
but it cannot exercise “exclusively legislative” power. Sometimes the gaps will
be too big for the agency to ﬁll. That may have been the case in Youngstown.
And if that’s the case, courts need not strike down the statutory provision
which, after all, usually creates gaps of various sizes. The courts can instead
strike down only those regulations or executive actions (like Truman’s) that
are too big, or too important, or that otherwise meet the requirements
(whatever they happen to be) for “exclusively legislative power.”
C. Interpretative Rules and Hard-Look Review
Although a full exploration of the following implications must await another
day, it is worth pointing out that two of administrative law’s most persistent
puzzles may also be resolved by distinguishing specification and interpretation.
First, under the APA, interpretative rules do not have to go through
notice-and-comment rulemaking, in contrast to “legislative” rules.220 The test
for distinguishing the two kinds of rules is that a rule is legislative if without
that rule there would be an inadequate legislative basis for an enforcement
action.221 This creates a puzzle. Under the theory of Chevron, most legislative
rules are themselves interpretations of statutes. Indeed, the Mead doctrine
says that deference to agency interpretation is warranted precisely where the

Id. at 977, 1006.
Id. at 989-90.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018); see also Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995
F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
221 Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112.
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agency has promulgated a legislative rule.222 More still, under the Chenery II
doctrine, it is usually acceptable for an agency to proceed directly from a
broad statutory standard to an adjudication instead of resorting to
rulemaking223—suggesting that most of the time there is an adequate
legislative basis to enforce broad statutory standards, and so most
rulemakings are interpretative after all. In other words, under the current
doctrine, it is impossible to tell the diﬀerence between interpretative rules
and legislative rules because both are interpretations of some prior legal
authority that already provides a suﬃcient basis for enforcement.
The distinction between interpretation and specification may help resolve
this puzzle. Insofar as a rule or agency statement is in fact merely an
interpretation of a statute, then it would not have to go through notice-andcomment rulemaking because it is an “interpretative” rule under the APA. But
the lack of public participation in the process of arriving at that interpretation
ought to be acceptable because the courts would review such interpretations de
novo, without deference. But insofar as the rule is not merely an interpretation,
but actually a specification—the making of policy in the interstices of the
acknowledged bounds of the statute—public participation through the noticeand-comment process is and ought to be required by the APA. Courts do not
have much of a say here, but at least the public does.
This relates to a second puzzle: what is the relationship between “hard
look” or arbitrary-and-capricious review of agency policymaking and
Chevron’s second step?224 If regulations are all interpretations of statutes, then
courts should defer to reasonable choices made by an agency. But if that’s the
case, then there is no more room for hard-look review of the agency’s policy
choices—which by assumption are actually just constructions of the statute.
Put another way, if hard look review requires agencies to base their decisions
“on a consideration of the relevant factors,”225 and the relevant factors are
found in the statute, then Step Two and hard-look are identical. Several
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
Hard-look review is sometimes also called State Farm review after Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), which is often
taken as the origin of hard-look review. See Joshua Revesz, Voluntary Remands: A Critical Reassessment,
70 ADMIN. L. REV. 361, 379 (2018) (referring to the Court’s approach in State Farm as “hard look
review”); David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 530 (2011) (acknowledging
that State Farm review is sometimes called hard-look review). But see Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627
F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (outlining the evolution of “hard look review”); Joshua
McKarcher, Restoring Reason: Reformulating the Swerve Doctrine of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers v.
State Farm, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1342, 1342, 1362-63 (2008) (noting that the State Farm opinion
adopted D.C. Circuit Judge Leventhal’s “reasoned analysis” requirement for rescissions); Strauss,
supra note 13, at 1149 n.23 (“Judge Leventhal is . . . the acknowledged progenitor of ‘hard look
review.’”).
225 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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scholars and courts have therefore concluded that Chevron’s second step is
tantamount to hard-look review.226
The distinction between interpretation and speciﬁcation may resolve this
puzzle as well. Insofar as an agency’s act is truly an interpretive one, there is
no need for hard-look review because the courts in any event review such
interpretations de novo, and the analysis never proceeds past what is currently
called Chevron Step One. But if the agency action were one of several possible
policy choices, each of which would have been permissible under the statute,
then the courts still could police such acts of speciﬁcation to ensure their
reasonableness if that is what Congress intended courts to do by granting
courts the power of arbitrary-and-capricious review.227
V. CONCLUSION
When agencies implement statutes, modern doctrine describes their
activity as interpretation, raising the question of how much deference courts
ought to give such executive interpretations of law. Many scholars have
advocated great deference on the ground that interpretation of broad
statutory terms entails policymaking discretion, a claim that formalists
typically reject as violative of Article III. This Article has aimed to show that
when agencies implement a statutory scheme, they exercise both a power of
law-interpretation and of law-speciﬁcation. This Article has further aimed to
show that it is perfectly constitutional as a formalist matter for agencies to
exercise this speciﬁcation power, even if they cannot have ﬁnal say over the
interpretation of law. This suggests that calls to overturn the modern
deference regime may be correct, but likely overblown—at least if what
agencies are usually doing is not interpretation, but speciﬁcation.

226 See, e.g., Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 889 n.10 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We recognize
that there is support for the proposition that in review of rulemaking the second step of Chevron indeed
amounts to the same inquiry as arbitrary or capricious review under the APA.”); Bednar & Hickman,
supra note 11, at 1433 (noting that “[n]umerous subsequent D.C. Circuit opinions equate State Farm and
Chevron step two”); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1253, 1266-77 (1997) (arguing that the two inquiries overlap).
227 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2018) (describing arbitrary-and-capricious review).

